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Abstract
This paper models how migration both influences and responds to differences in
disease prevalence between cities and shows how the possibility of migration away
from high-prevalence areas affects long-run steady state disease prevalence. We de-
velop a dynamic framework where migration responds to the prevalence of disease,
to the costs of migration and to the costs of living. The model explores how pressure
for migration in response to differing equilibrium levels of disease prevalence gen-
erates differences in city characteristics such as land rents. Competition for scarce
housing in low-prevalence areas can create segregation, with disease concentrated
in high-prevalence ”sinks”. We show that policies affecting migration costs affect
the steady-state disease prevalences across cities. In particular, migration can re-
duce steady-state disease incidence in low-prevalence areas while having no impact
on prevalence in high-prevalence areas. This suggests that, in some circumstances,
public health measures may need to avoid discouraging migration away from high-
disease areas.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the reciprocal causality between migration and the incidence of disease.
While it is well known that migration can contribute to spreading diseases through the
effect of crowding, we study its consequences for the composition of populations, which,
in turn, affects the evolution of disease. If migration responds to disease incidence as
well as influences it, feedback effects may either dampen or magnify initial differences
in disease prevalence between locations. We show in particular how, for a large class of
infectious endemic diseases, migration can magnify initial differences, since the healthy
have a stronger incentive than the sick to flee unhealthy neighborhoods. This can turn
some localities into ”sinks” whose initial high disease prevalence attracts further sick
individuals because they cannot compete with healthy individuals for scarce space in
healthier localities. We show that several steady states can exist with different degrees of
segregation of sick and healthy individuals. In fact higher segregation is beneficial in the
model, since it unambiguously reduces prevalence in low-prevalence locations and does
not necessarily increase it in high-prevalence locations. This has implications for public
policy towards migration and may provide a case for encouraging or even subsidising
migration that has such results.
Epidemiologists have already addressed how individual migration may contribute,
among other factors, to the spread of disease1 and a few studies have assessed its rel-
ative importance in malaria’s eradication in the Early 20 Century United States (Barreca
et al, 2011) or the contribution of forced migration to the incidence of malaria in refugee-
receiving countries (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2006). But much less is known about
how migration in turn responds to infectious diseases, although numerous historical in-
stances have been recorded of people fleeing plague or other epidemics by migrating to
distant areas (see McNeill, 1997)2.
There is also abundant historical evidence of endemic disease as a factor in individuals’
location decisions. Historians have shown that infectious diseases causing high mortality
rates among settlers were a key determinant of European colonisation. Among other
examples, Acemoglu et al (2001) refer to Crosby (1986 pp143-144) who has shown that
the Pilgrim Fathers decided to migrate to the United States rather than to Guyana because
of the high mortality rates from infectious diseases in Guyana. We also know from Alexis
de Tocqueville and other witnesses of that period that it took the draining of the malarial
1See for example Boily (2002) on migration patterns of HIV infected sex-workers or Lurie et al. (2003)
on migrant couples in South-Africa with higher rates of HIV infection than non-migrant.
2During the Black Death, inhabitants from infected villages frequently migrated to less infected neigh-
boring villages. More recently, after the SARS outbreak in China, numerous workers in urban areas
returned to live with their families in safer rural areas (Le Point, 2003).
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swamps in the State of Michigan in the mid nineteenth century for the interior of the
state to be opened up by settlers on a scale comparable to what had already occurred
further west in Illinois3.
Even today there is a vast difference between different parts of the world in the in-
cidence of infectious disease. Mortality statistics published by the World Health Orga-
nization4 reveal that deaths from infectious or parasitic disease make up just over 2% of
all deaths in Europe, and some 3% of deaths in North America, while they make up over
52% of all deaths in Africa (9% of all deaths being due to malaria and 20% of all deaths
being due to HIV/AIDS). The world average is a little under 20% of all deaths. Given
the importance of infectious disease in mortality it would be surprising if individuals did
not take variations in its incidence into account in their location decisions. The location
of some important cities (Nairobi in Kenya, for example, or Colombo in Sri Lanka) seems
likely to have benefited from their low rates of malarial incidence compared to the rest of
the country.
Obviously there are correlations between high rates of disease prevalence and a high
incidence of poverty, and the complex linkages between poverty and infectious disease
make their interaction an interesting area of study. Economists have begun to study
the channels through which health outcomes interact with economic factors (Bell and
Gerbasch, 2006, Bell et al. 2006, Duncan et al. 2002, Hurd, et al. 2003, Marmot, 2002).
And there is strong evidence that epidemic outbreaks cause important economic losses5.
Furthermore, asset markets may also be affected, as was observed on the housing market
in Hong Kong after the SARS outbreak (Wong, 2008). However, among these linkages,
migration has attracted rather little attention and yet has been under increasing focus
since the SARS outbreak in China.
This paper models how the decisions of individuals to live in different areas are de-
termined both by the health environment, captured in our model by different prevalence
rates of diseases, and by economic factors such as costs of living. To capture the costs of
living or of any fixed asset or amenity attached to a given area, the price of which increases
with more people willing to settle in the area, we assume that there is a constant stock
of land in each city and that rents will vary to clear the market for land.6 This requires
3Alexis de Tocqueville arrived in Detroit in 1831 and was very troubled by mosquitoes during his
travels (he speaks in his journal of “inexpressible torment caused by mosquitoes”; Tocqueville 1981,
p.140). The initiative shown by Americans in organizing to drain wetlands impressed Tocqueville
and was one of the features he contrasted with the French dependence on central government. See
http://www.mackinac.org/article.asp?ID=25
4Downloadable from http://www3.who.int/whosis
5For example, losses associated to the SARS outbreak have been estimated between US$10 and US$30
billion, as compared to the 1994 outbreak of plague in India, the costs of which were estimated at around
US$2 billions (Robertson 2003).
6It may be more realistic for certain epidemics to consider the possibility of individuals fleeing high-
3
of course a dynamic set-up where the economic and health environment are affected by
migration, and in turn determine individual decisions such as migration.
At the beginning of each period individuals find themselves in one of two cities, which
differ in a number of characteristics including the prevalence of disease. The two cities
could also be interpreted as countries or regions, or even in some circumstances as different
sectors of the economy.7 Individuals have characteristics of their own, and in the model
we focus on their health status (wealth, which normally differs among individuals, is here
assumed to be the same for all individuals in one city so as to focus attention on differences
in health). These individuals must make decisions about whether to stay in their city of
origin or to migrate to the other city, which determines their consumption levels and
their risk of being infected in the future : the benefits of risk reduction must be balanced
against the costs, which here comprise not just migration costs but also any difference in
the cost of living in the two cities. Time is infinite and the significance of the future is
summarized in terms of a value function whose parameters are the health status of the
individual and the characteristics of the city where she lives, both of these considered at
the start of the following period. Each individual’s decisions therefore involve balancing
the impact of varying the migration choice on her current utility and her future discounted
value function.
We assume that healthy individuals in any one city are ex ante identical in terms of risk
of infection. In this respect we differ from Mesnard and Seabright, 2009, where individuals
differ in an individual risk parameter. As individuals may have more information than the
health authorities about their probability of being infected, we showed that quarantine
measures may have unexpected effects on the spread of diseases, as they may give too
high or too low incentives to migrate. This comes from the fact that migrants exert an
externality on other individuals living in the destination and origin areas, which depends
on their own risk of having caught the disease. The type of externality outlined in that
two period model affects the spread of disease in the short run - just after the outbreak of
an epidemic disease. In contrast, in the present paper we show that there is a qualitative
difference between short run and long run externalities. When the costs of migration are
prohibitively high, an individual living in a city with zero prevalence imposes a very large
prevalence cities to stay with friends or relatives in lower-prevalence cities, implying an aggregate tem-
porary population shift between cities without any adjustment on the land market. This is captured by
Mesnard and Seabright (2009) in an epidemic framework. Here, by contrast, we consider longer-run
location decisions where capacity constraints may play a significant role. In the model total capacity of
each city is fixed and cannot be changed by (for instance) construction, but less stringent constraints
would preserve the qualitative features of our results. Total capacity constraints also make it easier to
define and solve for a steady state as population size in each city remains constant over time.
7For instance, decisions of individuals to become sex workers, or within the commercial sex sector to
move between street prostitution and the formal brothel-based sector, are likely to be influenced by what
is known about relative risks of sexually-transmitted disease.
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externality in the long run if she acquires an infectious disease, because the people she
infects directly and indirectly lead to the disease eventually reaching a positive steady
state prevalence. However, if the same individual can migrate to a high prevalence city,
the long run externality he/she imposes is zero. The fact that migration may lead to a
sorting of sick/healthy individuals to high/low infected areas, has thus important policy
implications that are studied in the present paper.
We first present the model and then solve for a steady state in prevalence in circum-
stances where migration costs are sufficiently high to discourage migration both in and
out of the steady state. As expected we show that cities with a healthier environment
will have lower disease prevalence rates.
Next we examine the properties of the steady states when migration costs are suffi-
ciently low that healthy individuals in the high prevalence city will wish to migrate to the
low-prevalence city, thereby bidding up rents in that city and encouraging sick individuals
to migrate in the opposite direction. Historically there is good reason to think that seg-
regation of neighborhoods by disease incidence has an important influence on the spatial
composition of cities and countries, and that relative housing costs play an important part
in this process. The East End of London was considered a sink of disease (as well as of
other unsavory characteristics) and prosperous citizens paid considerable sums to live in
the West End, which thanks to the prevailing (westerly) winds could escape the noxious
odors emanating from the east more easily than the east could avoid those from the west
(the winds were thought to transmit disease - through ”miasma” - as well as foul odors).
Thus although we do not claim that the phenomena we model are the only or even the
main influences of infectious diseases on migration, it seems likely that they help explain
some important characteristics of the geography of development, past and present.
We show that, if all sick individuals do thus migrate, the prevalence rate in the low-
prevalence city declines to zero so that there are no more infected individuals and mi-
gration in the steady state no longer occurs. However, the possibility of migration is
important because it removes potentially infectious individuals from the locality where
they can infect the most other people. The possibility of migration strictly lowers steady-
state prevalence levels, and, it is unambiguously desirable to reduce migration costs to
make this possible.
Our prediction that migration may under certain conditions induce sorting by health
status has obvious echoes of the literature on segregation by individuals induced by their
demand for local public goods such as education. The idea that individuals might sort be-
tween locations according to their preferences for local public goods goes back to Tiebout
(1956), and there is a substantial more recent literature exploring the conditions under
which that sorting would result in segregation of households by income (see Ellickson,
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1971, for a pioneering contribution and Epple, 2003, for an overview). As documented by
Timmins, 2005, there is much controversy about the strength of such effects and about
how to estimate them econometrically. Particular applications have included sorting by
preference for education provision (see Be´nabou, 1996a, b, and Fernandez and Rogerson,
1996). There is a sense in which our model here documents broadly similar effects, since
the prevalence rate of a disease has the relevant characteristics of a public good (or more
precisely a public bad).
A distinctive feature of our model is that cities are likely to be in different steady states
depending on the level of migration costs, in some of which there is sorting by migration,
and with endogenous differences in health status even in the equilibria without sorting. It
is also true in our model, unlike in many public-good models, that some of these equilibria
can be Pareto-ranked, and in particular that there exist equilibria with the possibility of
sorting outside the steady state that dominate equilibria without that possibility. These
features in our view cast useful light on the possible role of migration policies in selecting
one equilibria.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the links to the literature on epi-
demiology. Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 explains how individuals make their
decisions, Section 5 studies the steady-state equilibria and shows that the existence of
one or the other equilibrium depends importantly on the level of migration costs. Section
6 discusses the policy implications and concludes.
2 Links to the literature on epidemiology
Related work on infectious diseases can be classified in three main strands. A first strand
of the literature uses dynamic models of epidemic diseases to understand the effects of
different policies on the evolution of infectious diseases. For example, Sethi (1978) studies
optimal quarantine programmes, which are modeled as an exogenous decrease in the
infectivity parameter characterizing a specific disease. One shortcoming of these papers
is that they assume away any potential behavioural response to the policies/changes
considered. However, there is growing evidence pointing out that individual behavior is
key to explain the evolution of aggregate disease (see Auld 2003, Reluga 2010 or Fenichel
et al., 2011 and Fenichel, 2013).
Two further strands of the literature capture this key role of individual decisions.
Models of decisions where individuals are rational have mostly focused on preventive
behaviours such as vaccine or safe sex adoption (Geoffard and Philipson 1996, Kremer
2000a, 2000b, Philipson, 2000); or partner choice decision (Philipson, 2000, Dupas et al.
2014). These studies obtain the common result that centralized measures may be inef-
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fective for a number of reasons overviewed by Chen and Toxvaerd (2014). For example,
Geoffard and Philipson (1996) show that if demand for prevention treatments such as
vaccines is prevalence elastic initially successful public health efforts typically run into
diminishing returns, not simply for technical reasons but because the decline of a dis-
ease discourages prevention. Similar considerations apply to the factors determining the
adoption of means of contraception as barrier methods for Sexually Transmissible Dis-
eases, and a growing literature now focuses on the microeconomic determinants of such
individual decisions, in order to reach a better understanding of epidemiological patterns
(See Gersovitz and Hammer (2003,2004) and Pattanayak et al (2007) for surveys of the
evidence on the prevalence elasticity of preventive behavior).
The third strand of literature, which can be characterized as Behavioral Epidemiol-
ogy, explores the consequences of individuals’ exposure to risk using models of bounded
rationality or studies how information about disease or the value of treatments spreads
via word-of-mouth learning (Medlock et al.,2009; d’Onofrio et al.,2013; Bauch et al.,2013;
Fenichel and Wang, 2013).
Although most of these studies appear to focus on a single aspect of epidemiology,
namely preventive behaviors, they explore a wide range of behavior types with very dif-
ferent policy implications. Depending on whether individual decisions are complements
such as for adoption of safe sex or substitutes such as for vaccination, interventions may
have very different effects on the overall disease prevalence. In particular, when prevention
leads to complementarities between individual utilities, multiple equilibria are possible.
Our model will show that the decision to migrate displays similar properties, which leads
to multiple equilibria and an interesting policy coordination issue.
To our knowledge, migration as a preventive behaviour has not been studied before
Mesnard-Seabright (2009) and the effects of migration restrictions such as quarantine mea-
sures have been overlooked by the literature using decentralized decision making frame-
works. Yet, as was observed in the aftermath of the Ebola crisis, individuals may respond
to strict quarantine measures by moving to different areas, which may have unexpected
effects on the evolution of diseases. In such circumstances, Mesnard-Seabright (2009)
highlighted potential unexpected effects of too strong quarantine measures pushing still
asymptomatic but sick individuals to escape from the epicentre of an epidemic disease:
individuals who are more accurately informed than the authorities about their previous
exposure to infection, may choose to migrate ”strategically” just after the outbreak of
an epidemic disease into a low prevalence area while still asymptomatic, which entails
negative externalities.
The present paper highlights another channel through which migration restrictions
for controlling spread of infectious diseases may have undesirable effects. Even without
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asymmetric informational issues, we show that too strict migration restrictions may lead
in the long run to an equilibrium with a higher overall prevalence rate of disease than
without restrictions. Indeed, strong migration restrictions may distort the sorting of
sick/healthy individuals to high/low infected areas.
3 The model
Consider a discrete time, infinite horizon model with two equally-sized cities in terms of
population, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}.8 Since our purpose here is to capture externalities due
to pure compositional effects we focus on the fact that migration incentives in one direction
create pressures for migration in the opposite direction because of resource constraints
and adopt the simplifying assumption that populations are constant, and normalized to
unity9.
Y denotes the constant per-period exogenous income in both cities (income is an en-
dowment, and agents are assumed identical in income).10 Out of this income, individuals
must pay a rent rit in the city in which they choose to live. To simplify the calculations
we assume that land is not scarce at the margin in the city with low rent, so that rit = 0
whenever rit < rjt. This means we can write rt ≡ rjt for the city with high rent. This
rent will be endogenously determined by a land market that clears when the net demand
of individuals for migration to the city with high rent is zero.
We assume that one city has a more disease-prone environment, which favors the
spread of disease vectors (think for example as low altitude or a high degree of humidity,
which may favor airborne or insect borne diseases). We will capture the degree of disease-
proneness of city i’s environment by a parameter αi and assume, without loss of generality,
that α1, α2 < 1, which ensures interior solutions by ruling out theoretically possible but
empirically uninteresting cases of diseases which affect the entire population.
Each individual can be in two states of health, denoted by θ: sick (S) or healthy
(H).11 At time t, a proportion pit of city i’s population are sick, the proportion of healthy
inhabitants being therefore (1− pit). We call pit the ”prevalence” of the disease in city i
8The two cities could also be interpreted as countries or regions, or even in some circumstances as
different sectors of the economy. For instance, decisions of individuals to become sex workers, or within
the commercial sex sector to move between street prostitution and the formal brothel-based sector, are
likely to be influenced by what is known about relative risks of sexually-transmitted disease.
9The case where population sizes can change together with the types of migrants after the outbreak
of an epidemic disease is already studied in Mesnard and Seabright (2009).
10Introducing heterogeneity in income level would only complexify the model without adding much
insight to the results. Rich individuals will have higher willingness to pay for high rents and live in the
low prevalence area than poor individuals and unless they are systematically more likely to be sick, this
will not affect the properties of the sorting equilibria according to health status we describe below.
11In contrast to Mesnard and Seabright, 2009 our model does not need to assume private information
of healthy individuals on their ex-ante risk of infection to generate unexpected effects of policy measures.
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at time t. We assume that the parameters αi are such as to ensure that
p1t + p2t < 1 (1)
to capture the fact that the sick are a minority of the total population.
There is an exogenous utility cost m of migrating from one city to the other. This
represents any kind of costs, which, like psychological costs, may be non monetary and
directly affect individuals’ utility. Utility is separable in this cost and in a term U (ct, θt)
that is increasing and weakly concave in consumption ct at time t.
The assumption that utility is separable in the migration cost greatly simplifies the
calculations because the derivatives of utility with respect to rents and disease prevalence
do not depend on whether an individual has migrated in any given period, but it is unlikely
that the qualitative findings of the model turn importantly on this restriction.
At the beginning of each period individuals observe their current health status. They
also have perfect foresight of the values of all parameters and city-level endogenous vari-
ables (namely Y,m, p,and r). They choose whether or not to migrate to the other city
and all individuals receive the incomes and pay the rents in the city they have chosen to
live in and consume the residual.
Accordingly, individuals living in city i face a per period budget constraint:
Y − rit = ct (2)
The health status of individuals evolves as follows:
Healthy individuals’ likelihood of becoming infected increases with the local preva-
lence, pit, and the degree of disease-proneness of their environment:
P [θt+1 = S/θt = H] = αipit (3)
Sick individuals recover from the disease naturally with exogenous probability pi.12
P [θt+1 = H/θt = S] = pi (4)
We assume pi < α2 < α1 in order to focus on interior solutions (diseases with higher
recovery rates never become established as endemic in the population).
12We could extend the model by assuming that this probability depends on health care availability and
quality, which may be higher where costs of living are higher. This would introduce two counteracting
effects: first, the differential in prevalence rates across cities in steady state equilibrium would increase
as the high prevalence city with low costs will have a lower rate of recovery than the low-prevalence city
with high costs of living. Second, this would give an incentive for sick individuals to stay in the high
costs city where they are more likely to recover. As long as there is a range of parameters’ values such
that the second effect does not fully off-set the incentives for sick individuals to live in the low costs city,
the results would remain qualitatively the same.
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The expected present value of current and future utility of individuals of type θt in
city i at time t is:
Wit =
∞∑
τ=t
γτ−1 [U (ct, θt)−mIt] (5)
where It is an indicator function taking the value 1 if they migrate in period t, otherwise
0.
We make the following assumptions about the effect of sickness on individual utilities:
Sickness lowers current welfare:
U (ct, S) ≤ U (ct, H) (6)
The marginal utility of consumption is independent of health status:
U ′ (ct, H) = U ′ (ct, S) for all ct (7)
This assumption, it should be noted, implies (by integration of the function over a finite
interval) that the utility cost of any given reduction in consumption depends only on the
amount of the reduction in consumption and not on the health status of the individual
experiencing it. Noting that utility is strictly monotonic in consumption, this assumption
implies that, for any θi and θj,
U (Y, θi)− U (Y − ri, θi) > U (Y, θj)− U (Y − rj, θj) if and only if ri > rj (8)
In the context of our model this has the consequence, as will be seen, that the healthy are
willing to pay more than the sick to migrate to live near to other healthy people.13 Our
model should hence be seen as exploring the consequences in equilibrium of an empirically
interesting phenomenon - namely the greater willingness of the healthy than the sick to
migrate to live near other healthy people.
Note that we do not allow individuals to smooth consumption across time. Allowing for
savings in our model would make each individual’s decisions in any period dependent on
the entire history of their consumption decisions as well as on their entire medical history,
which would greatly complexify the model with no extra gains for the understanding of
our main results. As it is, individuals’ decisions are fully determined by their current
health status and their city of residence, which gives us four distinct cases to study. We
therefore write the objective function explicitly as a function of current health status as
Wit (θt) .
13With the exception of Finkelstein et al (2013), who use data on elderly people in the US struck by
chronic diseases, there is remarkably very little empirical work on how marginal utility of consumption
depends on health, and we see no compelling reason to think that the relationship for communicable
diseases runs in one way rather than the other.
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4 Individual decisions
We first note that the objective function can be rewritten as follows, where i is the
individual’s city at the beginning of the period and k is the city in which she chooses to
live: Wit (θt) = U (Y − rkt, θt)−mIt + γθt+1Wkt+1 (θt+1)P (θt+1|θt)
where It = 1 if i 6= k and 0 otherwise.
From this it follows that Wit (θt) is strictly increasing in Y and strictly decreasing in
rkt, and weakly decreasing in m.
Next, for each value of the current health status, we compare the utility of each
individual in case she chooses not to migrate to the utility in case she migrates.
4.1 Individual migration choices
A healthy individual who chooses not to migrate and for whom therefore k = i will obtain
utility V Nit (H), which is equal to:
V Nit (H) = U (Y − rit, H) + γαipitWit+1(S) + γ(1− αipit)Wit+1(H) (9)
A healthy individual who chooses instead to migrate will obtain utility
V Mit (H), which is equal to:
V Mit (H) = U (Y − rjt, H)−m+ γαjpjtWjt+1(S) + γ(1− αjpjt)Wjt+1(H)) (10)
The agent who is currently sick and chooses not to migrate will receive utility
V Nit (S), which is equal to:
V Nit (S) = U (Y − rit, S) + γpiWit+1 (H) + γ (1− pi)Wit+1 (S) (11)
A sick individual who chooses instead to migrate from city i to city j will obtain utility
V Mit (S), which is equal to:
V Mit (S) = U (Y − rjt, S)−m+ γpiWjt+1 (H) + γ (1− pi)Wjt+1 (S) (12)
Consequently, the condition for healthy individuals to migrate rather than to remain in
their city of origin can be written as V Mit (H)− V Nit (H) ≥ 0, or written out in full as:
0 ≤ U (Y − rjt, H)− U (Y − rit, H)−m+ γαjpjtWjt+1(S)− γαipitWit+1(S)
+γ(1− αjpjt)Wjt+1(H)− γ(1− αipit)Wit+1(H) (13)
Similarly the condition for sick individuals to migrate, V Mit (S) − V Nit (S) ≥ 0, can be
written as out in full as:
0 ≤ U (Y − rjt, S)− U (Y − rit, S)−m+ γpi (Wjt+1 (H)−Wit+1 (H))
+γ (1− pi) (Wjt+1 (S)−Wit+1 (S)) (14)
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and we note that the conditions (13) and (14) are more likely to be fulfilled as rit − rjt
increases and as m decreases, as we would expect.
4.2 Migration flows
Denote by sjt (hjt) the proportion of the sick (healthy) who migrate from j to i in period
t.
The proportions sit, sjt, hit and hjt of individuals of each type migrating from one
city to the other result from aggregating individual migration decisions shown by the
equations (13) and (14). Hence, they are determined by the level of migration costs, by
the differential in rental rates, which clear the market for land and by the differential in
disease prevalences. Specifically, if inequality (14) does not hold, sit = 0, while if it holds
with strict inequality then sit = 1. Likewise, if inequality (13) does not hold, hit = 0,
while if it holds with strict inequality then hit = 1.
We know that those falling sick in any period on a given city consist of those previously
healthy in the same city who have not migrated outwards and have fallen sick, plus any
previously healthy in the other city who have migrated inwards and have fallen sick, plus
those previously sick in the other city who have migrated inwards and have not recovered,
plus those who were previously sick in the same city who have not migrated and who have
not recovered. We can therefore write the equations governing the evolution of prevalence
rates in the two cities as follows:
pit+1 = (1− pi)pit(1− si,) + αipit(1− pit)(1− hit) + pjt(1− pi)sjt + αipit(1− pjt)hjt (15)
where (1−pi)pit(1− sit) represents the sick in period t who do not migrate and remain ill;
αipit(1−p1t)(1−hit) are the healthy in t who do not migrate and become sick; pjt(1−pi)sjt
are the sick in period t who migrate from j to i and remain ill; αipit(1 − pjt)hjt are the
healthy who migrate from j to i and become sick.
For the land market to clear requires that net migration is zero, which, with equally
sized cities, implies:
sitpit + hit (1− pit) = sjtpjt + hjt (1− pjt) (16)
A final useful piece of notation is to define rHt (m) as the value of rt such that inequality
(13) binds for i = 1. Intuitively, rHt (m) is the value of rental in the high-rent city in
period t that is just high enough, given the level of migration cost m, to dissuade healthy
individuals from moving there from the zero-rent city. We define rSt (m) analogously as
the value of rental in the high-rent city in period t that is just high enough, given the level
of migration cost m, to induce sick individuals to move away from there to the zero-rent
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city. As we shall see, when migration occurs it is only of the healthy to the high-rent city
and of the sick to the low-rent city.
The next section characterises the different Equilibria that may occur, a subset of
which may represent steady states.
4.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the model at time t given prevalence rates p1t, p2t, is a set of values
rt, p1t+1,p2t+1, h1t, h2t, s1t and s2t such that
1) p1t+1, p2t+1 are generated by equations (15);
2) Equation (16) is satisfied (i.e. the land market clears).
The Appendix establishes by Lemma 1 that, in equilibrium, there cannot be migra-
tion in both directions by individuals of a given type. This necessary property of any
equilibrium is important to establish in Lemma 2 that an equilibrium exists.14 We now
consider the properties of equilibria in steady state.
5 Steady state equilibria
5.1 Properties of steady state equilibria
In the steady state, the proportions of individuals in each health category remain the
same across periods in each city, so we can write: pit = pit+1 = pi for i = 1, 2. Therefore
the rental rate which clears the market remains constant in steady state: rt = rt+1 = r.
Similarly, we can write the steady state values of rHt (m) and r
S
t (m) as r
H(m) and rS(m)
respectively.
Lemmas 3 and 4 in Appendix show interesting properties of the continuation values
for sick and healthy individuals to live in different cities in steady states, which allow to
establish the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 In steady state equilibrium with m > 0 healthy individuals, if they mi-
grate, will do so from the unhealthy city to the healthy city, while sick individuals, if they
migrate, will do so in the opposite direction.
With minimal loss of generality let α2p2 < α1p1 and call 2 the ”healthy city” in steady
state and 1 the ”unhealthy city”.15 Therefore s1 = h2 = 0. We ignore the case where
α2p2 = α1p1 since migration would not take place for any positive migration cost.
14Proofs of all lemmas and propositions not shown in the text are in Appendix.
15The healthy city can be the one with the more disease prone environment (α2 > α1 is compatible
with α2p2 < α1p1 )
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5.2 Existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibria
We now turn to studying the existence of different types of steady state equilibria.
It is straightforward to establish Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 There exists a steady state equilibrium with p1 = p2 = 0 and zero gross
migration.
This simply states that a disease cannot spread if it does not arise in the first place,
and follows from the fact that healthy individuals become infected with a probability that
is proportional to the prevalence of the city in which they choose to live. The fact that
there is zero gross migration follows trivially from the fact that if prevalence is zero there
is no motivation for migration from one city to the other.
However, the zero-prevalence steady state is not stable, in the sense that once an
infection arises it will spread until the rate of new infections equals the rate at which
sick individuals recover from the disease. Our next propositions examine the properties
of such positive-prevalence steady states and show that they depend on migration costs.
One Interpretation of such migration costs is the severity of restrictions on international
migration, but other interpretations are possible as well; the important point of such an
interpretation is that migration costs may be influenced by public policy.
We now examine the elementary case of steady states where an infection arises and
the costs of migration are high enough to discourage all migration within any relevant
neighborhood of the steady state (hit = sit = 0 ∀i, t). Where gross migration is zero, we
know that those falling sick in any period consist of those previously healthy who fall sick
in the same city, and in the steady state these will exactly match the numbers recovering
from the disease.
Indeed, the prevalence rate of disease in city i in period t + 1 will be equal to the
proportion of healthy individuals in period t who fell sick plus the proportion of sick
individuals in t who have not recovered from the disease. This can also be seen easily
after rewriting equation (15) in the case where hit = sit = 0 ∀i, t, which yields pit+1 =
αipit(1 − pit) + pit(1 − pi). Substituting the steady state conditions that pit+1 = pit = pi
implies that pi = 1−pi/αi for i = 1, 2. We have thus established the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When migration is impossible there exists a steady state in which pi =
1− pi/αi for i = 1, 2.
This defines a unique equilibrium and implies cities with lower α (as for example
low degree of humidity for the case of malaria) have lower steady state levels of disease
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prevalence and diseases with higher rates of natural recovery have lower prevalence in the
steady-state. We show in the Appendix that the steady state prevalence rate in each city
is locally stable.
Next we consider whether there exist steady states that are compatible with positive
levels of gross migration. We first establish some properties of such a steady state, if it
exists, and we consider the conditions for its existence later.
Proposition 1 has established that it is not possible in the steady state to have flows
of healthy individuals migrating to city 1 (h2 = 0) and flows of sick individuals migrating
to city 2 (s1 = 0). Where gross migration is not zero, the zero net migration implied by
clearing of the rental market implies that some proportion h1 of the healthy migrate from
high prevalence to low prevalence cities, and those who migrate in the other direction are
a proportion s2 of the sick (who,unless they recover from disease, have nothing to fear
from high prevalence). We specify ”a proportion” because of our assumption that there
are more healthy than sick individuals, so complete migration by both populations will
not be feasible.
Let the value ψ and φ be the the values taken in equilibrium by the variables h1 and
s2 respectively. Note that φ > ψ when migration is strictly positive, because p1t + p2t < 1
which implies that the sick in city 2 are less numerous than the healthy in city 1.
We use the dynamics governing the evolution of diseases in the two cities open to
migration and the properties of steady state equilibria established earlier to characterize
the steady state equilibria with non-zero gross migration out of the equilibrium as follows.
From (15) and given h2 = 0, s1 = 0 the steady state prevalence rates in city 1 and city
2 will respectively satisfy:
p1 = (1− p)(1− ψ)α1p1 + φp2(1− pi) + p1(1− pi) (17)
p2 = α2p2(1− p2) + ψ(1− p1)α2p2 + (1− φ)p2(1− pi) (18)
Moreover the ”adding up condition” has to hold in steady state, which implies that the
proportion φ of the sick who migrate in the steady state yields the same absolute number
of migrants as the proportion ψ of the healthy who migrate, so that
φp2 = ψ (1− p1) (19)
And the ”behavioral condition” implies that the demand for migration by proportion φ
of the sick is generated by the same r in city 2 as generates the demand for migration by
a proportion ψ of the healthy.
Replacing (19) into (17) and (18) gives the following conditions characterizing these
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steady state equilibria:
p1 = (1− p1)(1− ψ)α1p1 + ψ (1− p1) (1− pi) + p1(1− pi) (20)
p2 =
α2 − pi − φ(1− pi)
α2(1− φ) or p2 = 0 (21)
Studying condition (21) we can show easily that there will no longer be migration at
the steady state if p2 = 0 (Indeed 1 − p1 > 0 and equation (19) imply that ψ = 0).
Substituting ψ = p2 = 0 into (20), we show that: p1 = 1− piα1 .
The question now is whether such steady states exist. To explore this question, recall
that rH(m) and rS(m) denote respectively, for any m, the rental rate at which healthy
individuals in the high-prevalence city are just deterred from migrating to the low preva-
lence city, and the rental rate at which sick individuals in the low-prevalence city can just
be induced to migrate to the high-prevalence city. It is evident that rH(m) is decreasing
in m and rS(m) is increasing in m. Let m∗ be the value of m such that rH(m∗) = rS(m∗).
Figure 1 illustrates. It shows rH(m) and rS(m), which will cross at a strictly positive
value of m, which we have defined as m∗, provided that rH(0) > rS(0).16
Appendix shows that rH(0) > rS(0), such that we can establish the following Propo-
sition:
Proposition 4 There exists m∗ > 0 such that, for all m < m∗, an equilibrium exists with
p1 = 1 − piα1 and p2 = 0. In this equilibrium there is nonzero gross migration outside the
steady state but not at the steady state.
The intuition behind the proof is relatively straightforward: because the healthy are
more willing than the sick to pay to live in the low-prevalence city, there will be a rental
rate that compensates the sick for moving to the high-prevalence city and does not deter
the healthy from migrating to the low-prevalence city, provided migration costs are low
enough.
Note how the possibility of migration out of the steady state makes the crucial dif-
ference between the steady states described in Propositions 3 and 4 even though in the
steady state no actual migration takes place. This is because any infected individuals who
arise in city 2, instead of remaining in city 2 where they progressively infect the rest of
the population, migrate out immediately to city 1. This keeps the prevalence rate at zero
in city 2. It has no lasting effect on the prevalence in city 1, though, because in the steady
state there is no further in-migration and the prevalence in city 1 is determined in exactly
the same way as it was in the non-migration steady state.
16The linearity of the functions rH(m) and rS(m) is for illustration only. The only requirement for the
demonstration is that these functions are monotonic, as stated above.
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Moreover, we show in the Appendix that the Low migration costs characterized above
generate an unstable root, which pushes the prevalence rate in the healthy city to a corner.
This type of corner steady state is the only one compatible with positive migration flows
along the transition path and is robust to small changes of parameter values.
It is straightforward to show that there is no steady state equilibrium with non zero
gross migration in steady state (such that ϕ > 0, ψ > 0), because to do so would require
the two migration inequalities (13) and (14) to bind at the same level of r, which is
impossible as shown in the proof of Proposition 1.17
Having established the existence of these equilibria, we now turn to highlighting an
interesting property of the steady state with migration in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 In the equilibrium with p2 = 0, the healthy city may be the city with the
more disease-prone environment, that is, p2 < p1 is compatible with α2 > α1.
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from Proposition 1 and noting that
if p2 = 0, α2p2 = 0 < α1p1 whatever the value of α2.
This shows that, in the case of Low migration costs, there is a possibility of multiple
equilibria because of strategic complementarities in the utility function. Indeed the prob-
ability of becoming infected is a positive function of the degree of disease-proneness in city
i, αi, and of the proportion of sick individuals in city i, pi, but the latter is determined
in equilibrium. This generates a clear coordination problem and underlines an important
role of expectations in the model. A city can be established as the more healthy city, and
therefore become a destination for healthy individuals, with higher rents that drive out
sick individuals, simply because it is expected to be more healthy, in spite of having a more
disease-prone environment. However, it is unlikely that it would become so established
if migration costs are initially very high and are gradually reduced, since the autarky
prevalence of the more disease-prone city will be higher, so that initial migration by the
healthy is likely to be from the more disease-prone to the less disease-prone environment.
Finally, we can show that the range of values of m for which a steady state exists with
migration by the healthy to the city with the more disease-prone environment is strictly
smaller than the range of values of m for which a steady state exists with migration by
the healthy to the city with the less disease-prone environment. A consequence of the
proof of Proposition 4 is that rH(0) − rS(0) is strictly decreasing in the value of α2 as
well as in the value of pi. Thus the more disease prone the environment of the city to
which the healthy are migrating and the higher the recovery rate, the smaller the value
17In earlier variations of this paper we experimented with assuming heterogeneous migration costs,
which we conjectured led to equilibria with non zero gross migration in steady state but made the model
analytically intractable for little additional insight.
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of the m∗ for which a migration equilibrium exists. This is rather intuitive since a more
disease prone environment of the healthy city and a higher recovery rate make migration
less attractive as a way of escaping from endemic diseases.
This allows us to state our final proposition which characterizes existence conditions
of steady state equilibria for all values of m:
Proposition 6 For any value of pi, there exists two strictly positive values of m, m∗ and
m′, with m′ < m∗ such that, the following steady state equilibria exist:
1) when migration costs exceed m∗, there is no migration; p1 = 1− piα1 and p2 = 1− piα2 .
2) when migration costs lie between m′ and m∗, the only equilibrium has migration out
of steady state by the healthy from the city with the more disease-prone environment to
the city with the less disease-prone environment; p1 = 1− piα1 and p2 = 0.
3) when migration costs lie below m′ there are two steady state equilibria in each of
which p1 = 1− piα1 and p2 = 0. In the first steady state, city 2, the city to which the healthy
migrate out of steady state, is the one with the less disease-prone environment and, in the
second, city 2 is the one with the more disease-prone environment.
Figure 2 illustrates the relation of m′ to m∗.
5.3 Welfare comparisons
Now we can consider the comparative welfare properties of the steady states with and
without the possibility of migration. It is straightforward to see that the steady states
with migration are Pareto-superior to the steady state without migration. Prevalence
in city 1 is the same in the steady states defined by Propositions 3 and 4; only that in
city 2 differs (and is strictly lower in the migration steady states). Given that there is
no migration (and therefore no migration costs incurred) in all steady states, this means
that the steady states with migration have fewer sick individuals and incur no offsetting
costs. We have therefore established the following:
Proposition 7 The steady states with migration are Pareto Superior to the steady state
without migration.
However, we can also Pareto-rank the two steady states that exist when migration
costs lie below m′, since they differ in their values of α1, and therefore in the prevalence
rates in the high-prevalence city. It is immediate that
Proposition 8 The second steady state, that exists only when migration costs are lower
than m′, has lower prevalence than, and is therefore Pareto Superior to, the first steady
state.
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Proposition 6 has merely characterized the steady states according to whether or not
migration costs are low enough for gross migration to occur out of steady state. The fact
that the steady states with non zero gross migration out of equilibrium Pareto-dominate
that with zero migration has important implications for policy. In this model it is a good
thing for there to be outmigration of sick individuals from city 2 (driven by the higher
rents due to competition from individuals in-migrating from city 1). The reason for this
is that outmigration of such individuals removes them from where they would contribute
to new infections and places them in a city in which the disease is already established
and to which their presence will bring no lasting deterioration in the prevalence. In these
circumstances, action by the authorities should not be to discourage migration (which
may be a by-product of quarantine measure or of other types of migration restrictions)
but rather actively to encourage it. In the steady state there will in fact be no migration,
but out of the steady state such migration is an important means of reducing the risk
that the disease established in city 1 also establishes itself in city 2.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that differences in disease prevalence rates can emerge as the equi-
librium outcome of more fundamental differences in environment, with migration be-
haviour acting as a means of arbitrage between locations with different prevalence levels.
We have also shown that whether migration takes place out of the steady state has im-
portant implications for steady state prevalence levels even if there is no migration at the
steady state. In particular, it is desirable for infected individuals to migrate away from
low-prevalence localities since these are the ones in which they create the greatest nega-
tive externalities. This has potentially important implications for policy since it suggests
that, far from seeking to discourage voluntary migration in conditions of endemic disease,
it may sometimes be desirable to encourage it.
A key mechanism in our model is that the willingness to pay of healthy individuals
to live close to other healthy individuals exceeds that of sick individuals, which leads to
sorting by health and higher costs of living in healthier areas. This, however, is true only
under certain conditions. As we discussed, under certain alternative assumptions, it could
be that sick individuals would have a higher willingness to pay to live in low-prevalence
environments, which would act against segregation: recovery rates may, for example, be
higher in rich cities due to better health infrastructures and income dynamics or family
decisions may make sick people less likely to migrate to poor cities with high prevalence
rates. Moreover, as highlighted in Mesnard and Seabright (2009), under different as-
sumptions about the distribution of past exposure to the disease and the asymmetric
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information individuals may have on their own risk, migrants to low-prevalence destina-
tions may include a significant proportion of asymptomatic individuals likely to become
sick, thereby mitigating segregation effects in the short run even if they do not wholly
offset them.
Finally, we have shown that expectations may matter in this model with fully ra-
tional individuals, which leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria and generates an
interesting coordination problem. However, it is also possible that individuals are not
fully rational nor perfectly informed on their health risks when considering their location
decisions, which may lead to the existence of other equilibria.
The conditions described in our model are thus not general but they do constitute an
important class of cases for public policy to bear in mind. They warn policy makers to
take into account positive externalities generated by migration in the presence of endemic
diseases. Public policy needs to model very carefully the interactions between disease
and migration in order to ensure that policy interventions do not have counter-productive
consequences in the short run (Mesnard and Seabright 2009) and in the long run, as
highlighted in the present paper. We also believe that segregation by disease-prevalence
of neighborhoods within cities, and of regions within countries, has been a phenomenon
of historical significance which models of this kind can help us to understand. Given the
startling differences in disease prevalence between different regions of the world, it remains
of real significance today. And given the likely emergence of new forms of antiobiotic-
resistant infections in years to come, some of which may become endemic in certain parts
of the world, the problem can only grow in importance in the future.
7 APPENDIX
Appendix A : Proofs
Lemma 1: There cannot be migration in both directions in equilibrium by individuals
of a given type.
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is by contradiction.Suppose that if rt = r
H
t (m), inequality (13) is weakly
satisfied for i = 2.
Then, inserting rHt (m) in inequality (13) for i = 1 yields
U (Y,H)− U (Y − rHt (m), H) = Zt −m (22)
where
Zt = γα2p2tW2t+1(S)− γα1p1tW1t+1(S) + γ(1− α2p2t)W2t+1(H)− γ(1− α1p1t)W1t+1(H)
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Setting i = 2 in inequality (13) yields
0 ≤ U (Y,H)− U (Y − rHt (m), H)−m− Zt
and substituting equation (22) in inequality (13) yields
0 ≤ Zt −m−m− Zt
which is a contradiction as m > 0. This shows that inequality (13) cannot be satisfied
for both i = 1 and i = 2 if rt = r
H
t (m). For all rt > r
H
t (m) inequality (13) will not be
satisfied for i = 1, while for all rt < r
H
t (m) inequality (13) will not be satisfied for i = 2.
Thus inequality (13) cannot be simultaneously satisfied for i = 1 and i = 2 at any value
of rt. Analogous arguments when inequality (14) binds for i = 2 inequality (14) cannot
be simultaneously satisfied for i = 1 and i = 2 at any value of rt. QED
Lemma 2 establishes that an equilibrium exists:
Lemma 2: For any p1t, p2t and for any s1t, s2t implied by p1t, p2t, there exist hit,for
i = 1, 2 such that Equation (16) is satisfied with 0 ≤ hit ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1 we know that if sit > 0, sjt = 0 and that if hit > 0, hjt = 0. Thus
equation (16) implies
sitpit = hjt (1− pjt) for i = 1, 2
which can be rewritten
hj, =
sitpit
(1− pjt) for i = 1, 2
Since equation (1) implies that 0 ≤ pit < (1− pjt) and since 0 ≤ sit ≤ 1, it follows that
0 ≤ hit ≤ 1. QED
Properties of Steady State Equilibria
We write Wi (H) = Wit (H) = Wit+1 (H) and Wi (S) = Wit (S) = Wit+1 (S) for the
continuation value of living in city i for a healthy and a sick individual respectively.
We can therefore write the migration conditions (13) and (14) in their steady state
forms as
0 ≤ U (Y − rj, H)− U (Y − ri, H)−m+ γαjpjWj(S)− γαipiWi(S)
+γ(1− αjpj)Wj(H)− γ(1− αipi)Wi(H) (23)
and
0 ≤ U (Y − rj, S)− U (Y − ri, S)−m+ γpi (Wj (H)−Wi (H))
+γ (1− pi) (Wj (S)−Wi (S)) (24)
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We can then show two properties of the continuation values summarised in Lemmas 3
and 4.
Lemma 3: In steady state equilibrium, the additional continuation value of being
healthy rather than sick in city i, Wi (H) −Wi (S), is strictly positive and decreasing in
the prevalence rate pi, in the unhealthiness parameter αi, and in the recovery rate pi.
Proof
Subtracting equation (11) from equation (9) yields
W i (H)−W i (S) = U (Y − ri, H)− U (Y − ri, S)
+γ(1− αipi − pi)W i (H)− γ(1− αipi − pi)W i (S)
which implies that
W i (H)−W i (S) = U (Y − ri, H)− U (Y − ri, S)
1− γ(1− αipi − pi)
which is strictly positive by assumption (6) and strictly decreasing in αi, pi and pi.QED.
Lemma 4: In steady state equilibrium, if αjpj > αipi the difference between the
additional continuation values for healthy and sick individuals of living in city i rather
than in city j, (Wi (H)−Wj (H))− (Wi (S)−Wj (S)), is strictly positive and decreasing
in the prevalence rate pi, in the unhealthiness parameter αi, and in the recovery rate pi.
Proof
From equation (9) we can write
W i (H)−W j (H) = U (Y − ri, H)− U (Y − rj, H) + γαipiW i (S)− γαjpjW j (S)
+γ (1− αipi)W i (H)− γ (1− αjpj)W j (H) (25)
Similarly,
W i (S)−W j (S) = U (Y − ri, S)− U (Y − rj, S) + γpi
[
W i (H)−W j (H)]
+γ (1− pi) [W i (S)−W j (S)] (26)
First, note that U (Y − ri, θ) − U (Y − rj, θ) is independent of θ by Equation (8), thus
[U (Y − ri, H)− U (Y − rj, H)]− [U (Y − ri, S)− U (Y − rj, S)] = 0.
Therefore subtracting (26) from (25) and re-arranging yields
W i (H)−W j (H)− [W i (S)−W j (S)] = W i (H) [γ(1− αipi − pi)]−W i (S) [γ(1− αipi − pi)]
...−W j (H) [γ(1− αjpj − pi)] +W j (S) [γ(1− αjpj − pi)]
22
which in turn yields
W i (H)−W j (H)−W i (S)+W j (S) = 1
1− γ(1− pi)
[
αjpj
(
W j (H)−W j (S))− αipi (W i (H)−W i (S))]
The RHS expression is strictly positive because αjpj > αipi and
αipi
(
W i (H)−W i (S)) = αipiU (Y − ri, H)− U (Y − ri, S)
1− γ(1− αipi − pi)
which is strictly increasing in αipi because
x
1+c+bx
is strictly increasing in x for all x if
1 + c ≥ 0. QED.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Define r∗(S) as the value of r2 such that inequality (24) binds for i = 1. Intuitively,
r∗(S) is the value of rental in the low-prevalence city that is just high enough to dissuade
sick individuals from moving there from the high-prevalence city. This yields
U (Y, S)− U (Y − r∗(S), S) = Z ′ −m (27)
where
Z
′
= γpi
(
W 2 (H)−W 1 (H))+ γ (1− pi) (W 2 (S)−W 1 (S))
Substracting Z
′
from Z yields
Z − Z ′ = W 2(H) [γ(1− α2p2 − pi)]−W 1(H) [γ(1− α1p1 − pi)]
+W 2(S) [γ (α2p2 + pi − 1)]−W 1(S) [γ (α1p1 + pi − 1)]
Simplifying yields
Z − Z ′ = γ(1− α2p2 − pi)
[
W 2(H)−W 2(S)]− γ(1− α1p1 − pi) [W 1(H)−W 1(S)]
This must be strictly greater than zero since (1 − α2p2 − pi) > (1 − α1p1 − pi) and
W 2(H) − W 1(H) ≥ W 2(S) − W 1(S) from Lemma 4. Therefore, from equations (22)
and (27) we can see that
U (Y,H)− U (Y − r∗(H), H) > U (Y, S)− U (Y − r∗(S), S)
which implies that r∗(H) > r∗(S) given equation (8). Thus sick individuals will be dis-
suaded from migrating to the low-prevalence city at a lower rental rate than will dissuade
healthy individuals. Thus for any rental rate at which sick individuals want to migrate to
the low-prevalence city, healthy individuals also want to migrate in this direction. Since
by Lemma 1 there cannot be individuals of either health status simultaneously wishing
to migrate in the opposite direction, this cannot be an equilibrium satisfying the zero
net migration condition. Thus in equilibrium sick individuals, if they migrate at all in
equilibrium, must migrate only to the high-prevalence city. Analogous arguments show
that sick individuals will choose to migrate from the high-prevalence city at a lower rental
rate than healthy individuals.
Therefore there is no rental rate at which only sick individuals migrate to the low-
prevalence city and healthy individuals to the high-prevalence city. Thus healthy individ-
uals, if they migrate, will do so from the high-prevalence to the low-prevalence city while
sick individuals, if they migrate, will do so in the opposite direction. QED
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Proof of Proposition 4
Using Equation (13) we define rHt (m) implicitly as follows:
m = U
(
Y − rHt (m), H
)− U (Y,H) + γαjpjtWjt+1(S)− γαipitWit+1(S)
+γ(1− αjpjt)Wjt+1(H)− γ(1− αipit)Wit+1(H) (28)
Substituting i = 1 and j = 2, taking steady state values and noting that p1 = 1− piα1 and
p2 = 0 yields
m = U
(
Y − rH(m), H)− U (Y,H)
+γ(pi − α1)W1(S)
+γW2(H)− γ(1− α1 + pi)W1(H) (29)
Using Equation (14) we define rSt (m) implicitly as follows:
m = U (Y, S)− U (Y − rSt (m), S)+ γpi (Wjt+1 (H)−Wit+1 (H))
+γ (1− pi) (Wjt+1 (S)−Wit+1 (S)) (30)
Substituting i = 2 and j = 1, taking steady state values and noting that p1 = 1− piα1 and
p2 = 0 yields:
m = U (Y, S)− U (Y − rS(m), S)+ γpi (W1 (H)−W2 (H))
+γ (1− pi) (W1 (S)−W2 (S)) (31)
Equation (8) implies that rH(0) > rS(0) if U (Y,H) − U (Y − rH(0), H) > U (Y, S) −
U
(
Y − rS(0), S).
Define R ≡ (U (Y,H)− U (Y − rH(0), H)) − (U (Y, S)− U (Y − rS(0), S)). Then,
setting m = 0 and using equations (29) and (31) yields:
R = γW2(H)− γ(1− α1 + pi)W1(H) + γ(pi − α1)W1(S)
+γpi (W1 (H)−W2 (H)) + γ (1− pi) (W1 (S)−W2 (S)) (32)
This can be rewritten as R = Aγ(1− pi) +B(α1 − pi), where
A = (W2 (H)−W1 (H))− (W2 (S)−W1 (S))
which, since α1p1 > α2p2, is strictly positive by Lemma 4, and
B = (W1 (H)−W1 (S))
which is strictly positive by Lemma 3. Therefore R > 0, which implies that rH(0) > rS(0).
Using the definition of m∗ this implies that m∗ > 0.
Lemmas 3 and 4 also imply that R, and therefore rH(0) − rS(0), is decreasing in α2
and in pi.QED
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Appendix B
Local Stability of the Equilibrium without Migration
pit+1 = u(pit) = αipit(1− pit) + pit(1− pi)
The steady state equilibrium in each city is a fixed point such that u′(pi) = pi.
We can derive the function u(.) as u′(pit) = 1 − pi + αi − 2αipit and note that the
steady state pi is stable if |u′(pit)| < 1 around the steady state.
This condition is equivalent to
2(αipit − 1) < −pi + αi < 2αipit
We can show easily that 2(αipit − 1) < −pi + αi since −pi + αi > 0 by assumption and
αipit < 1.
Since pi = 1 − pi/αi for i = 1, 2 we show easily that, close to the steady state,
2αipit ∼= 2(αi − pi), which is clearly larger than αi − pi.
Therefore the steady state equilibrium is locally stable.
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Local Stability of the Equilibria with Migration
We have the following dynamic system
p1t+1 = f(p1t, p2t) = [(1− p1t)(1− h1t)α1 + (1− pi)] p1t + s2tp2t(1− pi)
p2t+1 = g(p1t, p2t) = h1t(1− p1t)α2p2t + α2p2t(1− p2t) + (1− s2t)p2,(1− pi)
We note
J =
(
(1− pi)− (1− h1t)α1p1t + (1− h1t)α1 s2t(1− pi)
−h1tα2p2t α2 − α2p2t + h1t(1− p1t)α2 + (1− s2t)(1− pi)
)
After writing p(χ) = |J − χI| =
∣∣∣∣ fp1 − χ fp2gp1 gp2 − χ
∣∣∣∣, we can study the Eigenvalues of J ,
roots of the equation p(χ) ≡ χ2 − (trJ)χ+ det J = 0.
We know that in Equilibrium s2(=φ)= h1(=ψ)= 0, p1 = 1 − pi/α1 and p2 = 0 such
that J =
(
1 0
0 α2 + 1− pi
)
and p(χ) can be rewritten as:
p(χ) = χ2 − (2− pi + α2)χ+ (α2 + 1− pi)
The two Eigenvalues χ1 and χ2 are as follows:
χ1 = α2 − pi + 1
χ2 = 1
Since |χ1| > 1 and |χ2| = 1 such equilibria are locally unstable.
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